c e r t e r r e s t i m a t e r i a l e a t o g e s t a r t f i a c t i v a c c i n a e s c a p e l a t i s u e d e s c r
f a n t i s t i m u l t e r i g e n e t h n g r p h e n o m e s n o m e a s l i t e r e c i l s e
Thursday, August 30, 2012
Wednesday, August 22, 2012
Pass me the salt
To speak of, to speak about something outside of the elements that are used to speak (voice, language, words) is one thing; to speak of the act of speaking using those same elements is another. There are probably more nuanced levels to this basic opposition, but this is a good start for them.
If I say, without using quotes, please pass me the salt, it will mean I am at the moment asking for the salt. When I say, "Please pass me the salt," then I am indicating that this passage could have been spoken by someone else; if it were me, then I would be quoting myself having said it a while ago. In both cases, I am underlining the existence of "Please pass me the salt" as an act of language, reporting it and indicating to you that apart from the minimum message it carries (which is, pass me the salt please), there is at least another one which engages your ability to read it as an artefact of language. That is, as a collection of words, pure and simple.
If you read that line in a novel, or hear it in a film, you surely would not get up and get the salt from the kitchen. Or if we were in any non-dining setting that doesn't involve the occult, say in a Mathematics classroom, and you hear me say "Please pass me the salt" in the middle of a lesson, you would either think I am in a unique mental state, or that I mistook the class as the one we have for Linguistics or Cooking or Chemistry.
But in these cases, we will be treating "Please pass me the salt" as an oddity in the absence of a motivating context. as if it were a detached string of signs. Treating it as a symptom of mental instability gives it a raison d'être, but doesn't diminish its "detached" status. It is actually this detachment or its isolation from what we consider to be legitimate occasions of usage that we diagnose the speaker's state to be unique.
Even in a theatre piece, or in a film, we want this line to have sufficient motivation to be considered a good modelling of legitimate or illegitimate use. If we do have a line like this that did not have sufficient motivation, it might be that the writer is using an aleatory style in composing, or that the writer is using it to indicate the mental state of his/her personage. In this situation, we have a modelling of a "detached" usage, indeed giving it an artistic occasion for use, but ironically founded on its very nature as "unoccasioned" or detached utterance.
Even in a literary context, the persistence of "biographical" interpretations indicates an extended resistance to the "death of the author." The notions of writing without a writer, a speech without a speaker, or even a reading without a reader, remain difficult to imagine. Even if we comprehend the line "Please pass me the salt,'' that doesn't guarantee that we understood it all. If we find a text that has
we start imagining all the possible contexts for it. All by themselves, the words are just making a sentence. This is emphasized by putting quotes around them. Even by simply placing them thus on the page already draws your attention to the words themselves. Using italics also does the same job.
"Please pass me / the salt."
All of these are still within the common modern practices of say, literary writing and interpretation, or linguistic lessons. Nothing really strange about it, even when traditional linearisation is violated:
Please
pass me the
salt.
There would be two basic ways to handle it: one, we find the context so we can read beyond what the words are saying; two, we can start treating the words as just that: nothing but words (In Hamlet we recall, "What are you reading?" "Words, words, words") The questions to ask then would be: when do we do that? Will that be a new way to "read" (that is, if that still applies)? And, why "just" words? Can that be done at all? How can we know where one procedure ends and the other begins?
If we encounter a "fontified" line like
PL Ea SsS S EpAsss
meee t
hesss a L T
with other stylizations in place, we can certainly do both approaches. We can think of it as some kind of slurred speech trying to annoy somebody, or some kind of speech defect, or a snake given the power to speak and ready for dinner. We can also appreciate the foreboding fragmentation of the linguistic elements from its sound to its appearance. The message can now vary from "Please pass me the salt" to "Plea S Sepass met his alt" or someone asking someone else to meet another person named Hess, a lieutenant. It can mean that there is a plea from SSS Seapass to meet in a place called Hesalt. Thus, from an ordinary line that can mean many things in many contexts, we get other lines that can mean other things. Aside from providing more avenues for ambiguity, the "fontification" of lines like this can strengthen the suspension of recycled meanings and intensify its detachment as a playful material form. By making its final meaning indeterminate at many turns, the line leaves us with nothing but a surface of ink and markings peeled off from known signifying functions.
We can find this writing trend in many texts, like in those ones that have been called "visual poetry" and "lettrism." (There is indeed a large body of history in the modern arts that we can try to recall to situate the questions we have brought up so far.) In many cases, the medium of language not just becomes the subject of the work, but also an object no more signifying or non-signifying than other objects (like in asemic art). In short, pick your styles, or approaches, or biases; there are so many nowadays.
If I say, without using quotes, please pass me the salt, it will mean I am at the moment asking for the salt. When I say, "Please pass me the salt," then I am indicating that this passage could have been spoken by someone else; if it were me, then I would be quoting myself having said it a while ago. In both cases, I am underlining the existence of "Please pass me the salt" as an act of language, reporting it and indicating to you that apart from the minimum message it carries (which is, pass me the salt please), there is at least another one which engages your ability to read it as an artefact of language. That is, as a collection of words, pure and simple.
If you read that line in a novel, or hear it in a film, you surely would not get up and get the salt from the kitchen. Or if we were in any non-dining setting that doesn't involve the occult, say in a Mathematics classroom, and you hear me say "Please pass me the salt" in the middle of a lesson, you would either think I am in a unique mental state, or that I mistook the class as the one we have for Linguistics or Cooking or Chemistry.
But in these cases, we will be treating "Please pass me the salt" as an oddity in the absence of a motivating context. as if it were a detached string of signs. Treating it as a symptom of mental instability gives it a raison d'être, but doesn't diminish its "detached" status. It is actually this detachment or its isolation from what we consider to be legitimate occasions of usage that we diagnose the speaker's state to be unique.
Even in a theatre piece, or in a film, we want this line to have sufficient motivation to be considered a good modelling of legitimate or illegitimate use. If we do have a line like this that did not have sufficient motivation, it might be that the writer is using an aleatory style in composing, or that the writer is using it to indicate the mental state of his/her personage. In this situation, we have a modelling of a "detached" usage, indeed giving it an artistic occasion for use, but ironically founded on its very nature as "unoccasioned" or detached utterance.
Even in a literary context, the persistence of "biographical" interpretations indicates an extended resistance to the "death of the author." The notions of writing without a writer, a speech without a speaker, or even a reading without a reader, remain difficult to imagine. Even if we comprehend the line "Please pass me the salt,'' that doesn't guarantee that we understood it all. If we find a text that has
Please pass me / the salt.
we start imagining all the possible contexts for it. All by themselves, the words are just making a sentence. This is emphasized by putting quotes around them. Even by simply placing them thus on the page already draws your attention to the words themselves. Using italics also does the same job.
"Please pass me / the salt."
All of these are still within the common modern practices of say, literary writing and interpretation, or linguistic lessons. Nothing really strange about it, even when traditional linearisation is violated:
Please
pass me the
salt.
There would be two basic ways to handle it: one, we find the context so we can read beyond what the words are saying; two, we can start treating the words as just that: nothing but words (In Hamlet we recall, "What are you reading?" "Words, words, words") The questions to ask then would be: when do we do that? Will that be a new way to "read" (that is, if that still applies)? And, why "just" words? Can that be done at all? How can we know where one procedure ends and the other begins?
If we encounter a "fontified" line like
PL Ea SsS S EpAsss
meee t
hesss a L T
with other stylizations in place, we can certainly do both approaches. We can think of it as some kind of slurred speech trying to annoy somebody, or some kind of speech defect, or a snake given the power to speak and ready for dinner. We can also appreciate the foreboding fragmentation of the linguistic elements from its sound to its appearance. The message can now vary from "Please pass me the salt" to "Plea S Sepass met his alt" or someone asking someone else to meet another person named Hess, a lieutenant. It can mean that there is a plea from SSS Seapass to meet in a place called Hesalt. Thus, from an ordinary line that can mean many things in many contexts, we get other lines that can mean other things. Aside from providing more avenues for ambiguity, the "fontification" of lines like this can strengthen the suspension of recycled meanings and intensify its detachment as a playful material form. By making its final meaning indeterminate at many turns, the line leaves us with nothing but a surface of ink and markings peeled off from known signifying functions.
We can find this writing trend in many texts, like in those ones that have been called "visual poetry" and "lettrism." (There is indeed a large body of history in the modern arts that we can try to recall to situate the questions we have brought up so far.) In many cases, the medium of language not just becomes the subject of the work, but also an object no more signifying or non-signifying than other objects (like in asemic art). In short, pick your styles, or approaches, or biases; there are so many nowadays.
Tuesday, August 21, 2012
&
"lt=&=""to=""unexpectedly,=""very=""was=""writing,=""writing.=""of=""opacity=""outright=""=""in=""opaquely=""opposite:=""e=""fact,=""favor=""pasted=""force=""poured=""premise=""procedures="".=""physically=""poetry,=""poetry=""quantifiable=""reframed,=""rejecting=""sampled,=""may=""most=""some=""something=""moved=""objects,=""
Sunday, August 19, 2012
p
p
r o t e
r m i a b l e
n d e a r
k e n i
g n i t
r o s p e c u r
s u r r
e v e r
s i m i
l
v a g r i s m a n t r c h a n c e l l a t t i c r a c y
c a m o u f l i m i n i a t u r a l g a l a c i d i t t h e r a m b i g t y
o n e i r o m b i l i c i r c u m l e t t r o a m i n d l e s o u n d e r s t a t
q u e s s e n t i m e n t e l l e t c e e r a d i i a t e n d i n
Tuesday, August 14, 2012
briefly
1 Language forms: classical and modern, from the Greeks up to Mallarmé
2 Para-language forms: echoes of classical and modern; postmodern, para-syntactic, still use elements of the natural language, but violate known organization, linear order, logical structure, rhetorical expectations, etc. Non-linear texts, hypertexts, post-literate writing... (Private crypts/codes can be included here)
3 Post-language: violation of rudimentary forms more radical, but still uses slightly recognizable letters or morphemes, but words are either absent, altered, or replaced by crypts or glyphs ; at the extreme end of this spectrum would be asemic writing, shading off towards visual media.
4 Visual media: mixed media, where linguistic items are just a part of the whole, and do not play the role of master code. This is the last threshold towards the domain of the visual arts.
Monday, February 27, 2012
t
t h e w o r
d i s a g a
m b l e s h o
o t i n g t h r
o u g h t h
e f o g o f s e
n s e l e s
s n e s s
d i s a g a
m b l e s h o
o t i n g t h r
o u g h t h
e f o g o f s e
n s e l e s
s n e s s
Sunday, September 11, 2011
Friday, August 19, 2011
transcriptions, 19
transcription19
P l I D L 9 z m P V
p a l i m p s e s t
3 G Q w H Y 1 A y n
a n t i q u a r i a n
R 4 o a H b h l I 8
r e p r o d u c e s
w n 5 I S N L 7 L q
v a n i s h i n g
l J 3 F R T q g 2 0
l i b r a r i a n
M Y H i j 2 S v 8 N
m y s t i f i e d
b S t 5 7 0 9 q T s
b e s t s e l l e r
O r n U Q 1 L C w Z
o r p h i s t i c
A k 9 h k Z F f F m
a r c h a i s m s
A B w m 3 Z E S m g
a m b i g u o u s
Z 6 J p Z 7 y Q 3 a
s o l i l o q u y s
Q z g g T z b a Z Q
o n o m a s t i c
v H 9 H C 3 n m V h
v o y e u r i s m
K 0 a d s c D j s 4
b r o a d c a s t s
P l I D L 9 z m P V
p a l i m p s e s t
3 G Q w H Y 1 A y n
a n t i q u a r i a n
R 4 o a H b h l I 8
r e p r o d u c e s
w n 5 I S N L 7 L q
v a n i s h i n g
l J 3 F R T q g 2 0
l i b r a r i a n
M Y H i j 2 S v 8 N
m y s t i f i e d
b S t 5 7 0 9 q T s
b e s t s e l l e r
O r n U Q 1 L C w Z
o r p h i s t i c
A k 9 h k Z F f F m
a r c h a i s m s
A B w m 3 Z E S m g
a m b i g u o u s
Z 6 J p Z 7 y Q 3 a
s o l i l o q u y s
Q z g g T z b a Z Q
o n o m a s t i c
v H 9 H C 3 n m V h
v o y e u r i s m
K 0 a d s c D j s 4
b r o a d c a s t s
Friday, August 12, 2011
A text is a text is a text
1. A rose is a rose is a rose. Like a chair is a chair is a chair… the loop excludes transcendental signifieds. Warhol prints...
2. Since Gertrude Stein, we have seen language moves that no longer fall within the classic forms that have been institutionally validated as "poetic." The "poetic" has become more and more a term that designated a limited paradigm of reading. If it is overblown by many, if any claim is made on its behalf, it indicates not only an over-extension of the term but also an attempt to confer a cultural value to language moves that otherwise would not get any "cultural" or "market" value. Any move in a vast language game that impacts the way we handle that game does not need that label to get attention. Beyond the attempt to insert that move in the institutional market to get some attention, to call any writing "poetic" is narrow, restrictive, self-serving, and self-prophetic.
Thus, a general cultural bias simply reasserted itself when the existence of the category of the "poetic" was assumed a priori as an aspect of language use instead of suspending this assumption for the sake of objective linguistic inquiry. To assume something is not to prove anything. We should try to test another assumption, that there is nothing inherently poetic in the uses of language beyond the rhetorical and the formal, or beyond the market politics of institutions.
3. To remain within a hackneyed definition is to wallow in one's significance pond: a semantic self-delusion. It is to be caught up in the force of one's own can of demonstratives. To be unaware of a linguistic fantasy is naïveté; to be aware and to continue in the same path is self-delusional; to be aware of this awareness is a second-degree fantasy, that of self-parody.
Finally, to dismiss or to devalue powerful language moves that fall outside of our own valorized forms and rituals (especially when those moves offer inversions and critiques of our valued word order) is to display one of the most short-sighted traits of negative discrimination.
2. Since Gertrude Stein, we have seen language moves that no longer fall within the classic forms that have been institutionally validated as "poetic." The "poetic" has become more and more a term that designated a limited paradigm of reading. If it is overblown by many, if any claim is made on its behalf, it indicates not only an over-extension of the term but also an attempt to confer a cultural value to language moves that otherwise would not get any "cultural" or "market" value. Any move in a vast language game that impacts the way we handle that game does not need that label to get attention. Beyond the attempt to insert that move in the institutional market to get some attention, to call any writing "poetic" is narrow, restrictive, self-serving, and self-prophetic.
Thus, a general cultural bias simply reasserted itself when the existence of the category of the "poetic" was assumed a priori as an aspect of language use instead of suspending this assumption for the sake of objective linguistic inquiry. To assume something is not to prove anything. We should try to test another assumption, that there is nothing inherently poetic in the uses of language beyond the rhetorical and the formal, or beyond the market politics of institutions.
3. To remain within a hackneyed definition is to wallow in one's significance pond: a semantic self-delusion. It is to be caught up in the force of one's own can of demonstratives. To be unaware of a linguistic fantasy is naïveté; to be aware and to continue in the same path is self-delusional; to be aware of this awareness is a second-degree fantasy, that of self-parody.
Finally, to dismiss or to devalue powerful language moves that fall outside of our own valorized forms and rituals (especially when those moves offer inversions and critiques of our valued word order) is to display one of the most short-sighted traits of negative discrimination.
Beckett & the impossible voice
By intensely interrogating the line that divided discursivity and narrativity, the meta-textual procedures deployed by «Texts for Nothing» exposed the aporetic dynamic of the Beckettian oeuvre. As a failed voyager in a landscape that seems to impede progress at every turn, the Beckettian personnage never goes anywhere. The blocage seems to come from an essential difficulty: what is the difference between the speaking "I" and the narrating "I"?
The answer always sounds obvious. The first one does not tell a story and only speaks. The speaking "I" speaks because speech is done in the present, and the person saying "I" is the same person referred to by the word "I." This disambiguated state of the speaking "I" is its deictic advantage. When this "I" speaks, it cannot be part of a story. Even in a homodiegetic narrative, the speaking "I" cannot be part of the story without first becoming a narrator. In other words, I cannot tell a story at the same time as I am living its events. It would be magical to see the "I" realize the events of a story at the same moment it is spoken, like some kind of performative act. Towards the magical ending of One Hundred Years of Solitude, for example, the narrative time and time of narration coincide. If the "I" says "It is a Tuesday" and it is not really Tuesday, we start to think that this "I" is probably deluded or hallucinating. Or this "I" is probably not deluded at all or crazy, but is in fact telling a story in which the events that are being told are happening on a Tuesday. The "I" certainly cannot make the day a Tuesday just by saying it.
When "I" says It is a Tuesday when it is not a Tuesday, and if it is certain we are not hearing mad speech, then what we have is a memory or story. The question we then ask is: who or what or where is this "I"? Can a machine tell a story? If by "can" we mean having the physical capacity to produce words, whether as recording or as programmed strings, then we say Yes. But if "can" means to function as a narrator, dependable or not, real or not, then we tend to say No because we seem to require more from a narrator than just the ability to reproduce sound. (Another example: a grocery list is not a story primarily because we can't see any narrator in it.) However, the fact that anything can take the role of the narrator, living or not, already tells us about its indefinite nature. It is simply a linguistic function.
At the beginning of "Texts for Nothing," the homodiegetic speaker/narrator appears "suddenly." This instantaneous appearance on the scene is immediately followed by an assertion of the inability to "go on." On the second sentence, an indefinite "someone" addresses the speaker, forming a dialogical pair: "You can't stay here." This is quite understandable, and the contradiction is only apparent: the narrator function cannot have a deictic status in the here-and-now of discourse. But this situation is made more complex by the third line, which probably summarizes the whole aporetic dynamic of the text: "I couldn’t stay there and I couldn’t go on." This situational cycle repeats itself, and carries the speaker, strangely, for many more pages to come: " And were there one day to be here, where there are no days, which is no place, born of the impossible voice the unmakable being, and a gleam of light, still all would be silent and empty and dark, as now, as soon now, when all will be ended, all said, it says, it murmurs." The "impossible voice," "the unmakable being": don't these fit a good description of the narrator function? The weirdness of this voice comes from the fact that it is no one and nothing, and yet it speaks. "It’s not true, yes, it’s true, it’s true and it’s not true, there is silence and there is not silence, there is no one and there is someone, nothing prevents anything." Impossible, and yet cannot be unmade.
And who is the narrator's interlocutor? Is it another character? The indefinite nature of the interlocutor reveals the monological status of the text: "Someone said, perhaps the same, What possessed you to come?" Here we see one instance of the coincidence between the narrating "I" and the narrated "I." Often, too, this bipolarity extends to the problematic attempts of the narrator/speaker to include contextual orientation in the text, elements that would normally be deictic parts of discourse: "I’ll describe the place, that’s unimportant...." "How long have I been here, what a question...." "And now here, what now here...."
This aporetic movement may all seem to reaffirm the clear distinction between discourse and narrative, between the speaking "I" and narrating "I," but the substantial use of language items we normally associate with a speech situation coupled with the constant breakdown of any attempt to produce a progressive narrative line also seem to point out a difficulty that still requires resolution. The clear-cut distinction we thought we had between the two "I"s is always creating a problem: on one hand, a totally narrative "I" would be an impossible voice, a "someone" without place and time except in language; on the other, a totally discursive "I" with full deictic capacities would not be able to tell a story. In short, it becomes a choice between an impossible narrative which exists as a "nothing" ("Whose voice, no one’s, there is no one, there’s a voice without a mouth...") and a very restrictive speech that simply speaks but cannot ever progress without first falling into narrative, thereby losing its full deictic status and becoming another "nothing."
However, if " to speak of once, is to speak of nothing," then any use of language that does not carry with it any trace of story-telling or any trace of re-citation cannot even begin to exist as speech. Even in a conversation that goes "How do you feel?"/"I feel better now, thanks" is presumably carried within a stream of history laid out as a narrative or memory. An absolutely unique speech that happens only once for the first time and once only cannot be repeated or remembered. It is a speech that can't go anywhere, a speech that we can't even imagine to happen.
As the quandary of nothingness at every turn, this voiceless voice keeps turning, mute speech that echoes its absence again and again. Time without time, space without space, these texts for nothing outline a zone where language speaks when it narrates, and narrates when it speaks.
The answer always sounds obvious. The first one does not tell a story and only speaks. The speaking "I" speaks because speech is done in the present, and the person saying "I" is the same person referred to by the word "I." This disambiguated state of the speaking "I" is its deictic advantage. When this "I" speaks, it cannot be part of a story. Even in a homodiegetic narrative, the speaking "I" cannot be part of the story without first becoming a narrator. In other words, I cannot tell a story at the same time as I am living its events. It would be magical to see the "I" realize the events of a story at the same moment it is spoken, like some kind of performative act. Towards the magical ending of One Hundred Years of Solitude, for example, the narrative time and time of narration coincide. If the "I" says "It is a Tuesday" and it is not really Tuesday, we start to think that this "I" is probably deluded or hallucinating. Or this "I" is probably not deluded at all or crazy, but is in fact telling a story in which the events that are being told are happening on a Tuesday. The "I" certainly cannot make the day a Tuesday just by saying it.
When "I" says It is a Tuesday when it is not a Tuesday, and if it is certain we are not hearing mad speech, then what we have is a memory or story. The question we then ask is: who or what or where is this "I"? Can a machine tell a story? If by "can" we mean having the physical capacity to produce words, whether as recording or as programmed strings, then we say Yes. But if "can" means to function as a narrator, dependable or not, real or not, then we tend to say No because we seem to require more from a narrator than just the ability to reproduce sound. (Another example: a grocery list is not a story primarily because we can't see any narrator in it.) However, the fact that anything can take the role of the narrator, living or not, already tells us about its indefinite nature. It is simply a linguistic function.
At the beginning of "Texts for Nothing," the homodiegetic speaker/narrator appears "suddenly." This instantaneous appearance on the scene is immediately followed by an assertion of the inability to "go on." On the second sentence, an indefinite "someone" addresses the speaker, forming a dialogical pair: "You can't stay here." This is quite understandable, and the contradiction is only apparent: the narrator function cannot have a deictic status in the here-and-now of discourse. But this situation is made more complex by the third line, which probably summarizes the whole aporetic dynamic of the text: "I couldn’t stay there and I couldn’t go on." This situational cycle repeats itself, and carries the speaker, strangely, for many more pages to come: " And were there one day to be here, where there are no days, which is no place, born of the impossible voice the unmakable being, and a gleam of light, still all would be silent and empty and dark, as now, as soon now, when all will be ended, all said, it says, it murmurs." The "impossible voice," "the unmakable being": don't these fit a good description of the narrator function? The weirdness of this voice comes from the fact that it is no one and nothing, and yet it speaks. "It’s not true, yes, it’s true, it’s true and it’s not true, there is silence and there is not silence, there is no one and there is someone, nothing prevents anything." Impossible, and yet cannot be unmade.
And who is the narrator's interlocutor? Is it another character? The indefinite nature of the interlocutor reveals the monological status of the text: "Someone said, perhaps the same, What possessed you to come?" Here we see one instance of the coincidence between the narrating "I" and the narrated "I." Often, too, this bipolarity extends to the problematic attempts of the narrator/speaker to include contextual orientation in the text, elements that would normally be deictic parts of discourse: "I’ll describe the place, that’s unimportant...." "How long have I been here, what a question...." "And now here, what now here...."
This aporetic movement may all seem to reaffirm the clear distinction between discourse and narrative, between the speaking "I" and narrating "I," but the substantial use of language items we normally associate with a speech situation coupled with the constant breakdown of any attempt to produce a progressive narrative line also seem to point out a difficulty that still requires resolution. The clear-cut distinction we thought we had between the two "I"s is always creating a problem: on one hand, a totally narrative "I" would be an impossible voice, a "someone" without place and time except in language; on the other, a totally discursive "I" with full deictic capacities would not be able to tell a story. In short, it becomes a choice between an impossible narrative which exists as a "nothing"
However, if "
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